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Introduction
The  federal Conservation Reserve Program  (CRP) pays  farmers not to  grow
crops on highly erodible land.  The program is voluntary:  interested
producers agree  to plant soil-conserving cover crops on eligible  land in
exchange for an annual per-acre payment.  The agreement--in effect a long-
term rental of cropping rights--runs for ten years.
In this  report, we use a simple farm-level partial budgeting model  to
examine the short-term financial effects of entering southern Minnesota
farmland into the CRP.  We focus on how required shifts  in cropland
allocation alter farm income.  In doing so, we ignore other factors  that
might also be critical.  For example, we do not take  into account the
release of labor resources  that  land retirement brings  about.  Presumably,
less  land in crops means more  labor freed up  for other farm enterprises,
off-farm employment, or leisure.  Nor do we account  for the longer run
possibility of capital freed from its  current employment.
The analysis  is on a one-year, net-cash-flow basis.  We do not try to
predict  either the  scale or the scope of federal farm programs  in future
years, nor do we suggest that current price conditions will continue
unchanged.
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1This  is not a "What you should bid for the CRP"  report.  It  is  an
examination of current-year costs  and returns of  the CRP entry decision,
using southern Minnesota commercial farm data for illustration.
The Model
The  economic impacts of CRP entry are quite sensitive  to  the
particulars  of individual farm operations.  To examine entry costs  on a
set of hypothetical farms, we hold prices, yields, and planting costs
fixed and vary only the crop mix and the size and composition of the
commodity crop bases.  We use a simple model of farm operation, one which
calculates changes  in net cash returns--the simple aggregate of individual
crop and CRP revenues  less associated production and land maintenance
costs--brought  about by CRP entry.  Revenues come from market receipts  and
output-related government payments.  Production costs are  those avoided if
an acre  is not planted.  We assume no change in machinery and equipment
ownership, and we  examine first-year net revenues only.  We hold yields
fixed as well.  (Established ASCS yields are  frozen under current law, and
expected yields  are unlikely to  change significantly under plausible
scenarios.)  We show later  the effects of relaxing some of these
assumptions.
The model  is  only briefly described here.  Its mathematical  formulation
is  developed in the Appendix.  A detailed spreadsheet version--which can
be adapted for local price, crop,  and cost conditions--is available at
each county office of the Minnesota Extension Service.
The critical action of  the model is  the predictable manner in which CRP
entry affects cropland allocation.  Program crops, non-program crops, and
idled land are  the three  important categories.
2Changes  in permitted.  plantings of program crops:  Farmers participating
in federal crop programs  (80-90% of Minnesota  farmers) are allowed to
plant no more of a program crop than a particular proportion of their
established base in that crop.  (Commodity crop  acreage bases  are not
geographic designations:  they are accounting entities  used to  determine
government payments and to  limit program crop production.)  By law, CRP
entry reduces a farm's  aggregate acreage base by the ratio  of the number
of CRP acres  to  the  total number of cropland acres on the  farm.  We call
this requied reduction the  "base bite."  For example, a 25  acre CRP entry
reduces a 400-acre farm's aggregate base by 25/400, or  6.25%.
The base bite  in turn reduces  "permitted plantings,"  the legal maximum
acreage planted to a program crop.  This  reduction in permitted plantings
causes both government payments  and crop marketings  to decline as  well,
declines which are  also part of  the "cost"  of CRP entry considered here.
The landowner is  permitted to allocate the required base bite among any
or all established bases on the farm.  Since  the bite reduces revenues
proportional  to the acres reduced and to  foregone  receipts  (both
government and market),  it pays  the farmer  to  allocate as much of the bite
as  is  possible to bases which.are  the least lucrative.  In the examples
used here, wheat and oats bases return less per acre than does  corn base;
consequently,  farmers  are presumed  to  "bite" these bases  first, if
available.
Changes  in amount of idled land:  In our analysis, we assume  that
participating  farmers plant to  each program crop all  they are legally
permitted to--no more, no  less.  Under current (December 1987)  law, land
3equivalent to  20%  of the feed grain base and 27.5%  of the wheat base must
be  idled, or  "set aside."  If any base  is reduced through the base bite,
therefore, the idle land requirement  is also reduced.  For example,  if a
50 acre wheat base is  reduced to 40 acres by the base bite,  the idle  land
requirement associated with wheat base declines  from 13.75  acres to  11.0
acres.  This decline reduces  the cost of CRP  entry, because  total set-
aside maintenance  costs  thereby decline as  well.
Changes  in planting levels  of other crops:  Two factors  combine to
influence  the amount of  land available  for non-program crops  after CRP,
program crop,  and set-aside allocations have been made.  The direct effect
of CRP entry, of course,  is  to  reduce  the total amount of land available
for cropping.  However, as  we showed above,  the CRP through the base bite
indirectly reduces  the amount of land planted to program crops  and also
reduces  the amount idled under set-aside requirements.  This  reduction
acts  to increase  the proportion of land available for non-program crops.
The net effect of these  two forces, however,  is  always negative--each acre
entered  into the CRP reduces  land available  for non-program crops by a
particular fraction of an acre.  This associated decline  in non-program
crop revenue is  also counted as a cost of CRP  entry.
Total CRP entry costs:  The overall cost of CRP entry, then, is  the sum of
reductions in receipts  from program and non-program crops  less the
associated reductions in planting and maintenance costs on planted and
idled lands.  These must be compared against annual CRP payments  less
maintenance  costs.
4CRP Costs  on Six Farms
To  get an idea of the relative  sizes of these costs  and returns, we
analyze  CRP entry on the six representative southern Minnesota farms shown
in Table 1.  Acreage allocations  are hypothetical;  production costs  and
yields are drawn from the  files of the South-East and South-West Minnesota
farm records assocations.  Prices are December 1987.  Each farm has 400
acres in  total cropland, all of which is assumed potentially  eligible  for
CRP entry.  (This is a simplifying assumption.  On most  farms, only some
fields meet CRP eligibility criteria.)  Each farm faces  identical price
and cost patterns for corn, wheat, and soybeans  (Table 2).  (Later  we
examine other crop mixes.)  The farms vary only in the size and make-up of
their commodity program crop bases.  We consider both a relatively small
(25  acres) and a relatively large  (200 acres) CRP entry.
The change in net farm cash returns attributable  to  CRP entry on each
farm is  reported in Table 3.  These are average costs  for each CRP  acre
entered, so  they can be compared to  the flat per-acre payment  that the
government offers.  For example,  a 25  acre CRP entry on farm B reduces  net
cash returns by $171.58 for each CRP  acre.  A compensating CRP payment of
$80/acre, say, would result in an effective cost of entry of $91.58 per
CRP  acre.
Two factors  intermingle to yield the results  in Table 3.  The  first is
that each farm has a unique  "base ratio,"  its total  cropland divided by
aggregate crop base.  The base ratio affects the relative impact of the
base bite on crop  allocation--the Higher  the base ratio, the  larger the
base bite.  Whether or not CRP costs  increase with the bite depends  upon
5Table  1:  Distribution of commodity acreage bases  (acres).
representative farms.
Farm  Total Cropland  Corn Base  Wheat Base
A  400  100  0
B  400  100  50
C  400  200  0
D  400  200  50
E  400  300  0









Table  2:  Price, cost, and yield assumptions
Prices  (dollars/bushel)
corn (market)  : 1.82
corn (target)  : 3.03
wheat (market)  : 2.28
wheat  (target)  :  4.38
soybeans  (market)  : 5.80
Yields  (bushels/acre)
corn (expected)




Production costs  (dollars/acre)
corn production  :  125
wheat production  :  60
soybean production  :  70
set-aside maintenance  :  11
CRP establishment and  :  7.75
maintenance






6the  relative returns  of program and non-program costs.  Farmers  are
presumed to  have incentives  sufficient to  plant all permitted acres,
regardless of returns relative  to non-program crops.)  Examination of
Table 3 shows  that CRP costs  on farms with only corn base  (farms A, C, and
E) increase  as  the base  ratio  increases, while the reverse  is  true on
farms which can apply the bite to a wheat base  (farms B, D, and F).
What's happening here is  that higher base ratios mean higher base bites
and associated larger reductions in program crop plantings.  The higher
the ratio, the more CRP entry reduces plantings  in program crops  and the
less in non-program crops.  So if a program crop  like wheat returns  less
per acre  than beans, then CRP entry costs more for farmers with low base
ratios.  This  is because  soybean plantings are reduced proportionately
more.  The reverse  is  true  if the program crop  is corn, which returns more
per acre than beans.
Table 4 shows how a 200 acre  CRP reduces crop acreages  on farm B,D, and
F.  The larger the base ratio,  the more that plantings to program crops
like corn and wheat are reduced.  For example,  the  200 acre CRP  reduces
soybean plantings by 125  acres on farm B, but only  25  acres on farm F.
Taken alone, this ought to  result in an average cost of CRP entry on farm
F less than that for farm B.  However, at the  same  time,  corn acreage
is reduced by 100 acres on F and only 20  on B, due  to  the base bite.  The
combined affect is  a slight  increase in cost for farm F over farm B.
The other factor at play here is  the presence or absence  of wheat base.
This base  is  less lucrative  than corn base  in our examples,  so  it pays  the
farmer  to  allocate as much of the base bite as  possible to  the wheat base.
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8Once the wheat base is  used up  in this manner, additional CRP acres will
bite into  the more lucrative  corn base, and the  average net cost of entry
will rise.
This second factor can be demonstrated by examining marginal  costs, the
cost of one additional acre of CRP entry.  We are most interested in any
change in marginal costs when CRP entry increases past the  "break point,"
the amount of CRP entry that just uses  up the  less lucrative base through
the base bite.  Each CRP  acre after that bites into the corn base, so  the
cost of entry shifts  significantly once past the break point.  We show
this,  for the three  farms that have both corn and wheat bases,  in
Table 5.
The combination of these  factors--the influence of  the base ratio,  the
importance of relative crop returns,  and the shift  in marginal costs--is
shown in Table 6, which shows CRP  costs for various  CRP entries on farm D.
As CRP entry levels  increase past the break-point  (80 acres),  the overall
average CRP cost also  increase, due to  the increasing bite on the corn
base.  Prior to  that point, the average  cost curve  is  flat.  Note  that the
per-acre CRP cost shown for soybeans  is unaffected by increasing CRP
entry.  This  is because the calculated reduction in returns  allocated to
beans by the model is  the  same for each acre of CRP entry, even though the
number of acres planted to  soybeans is  inversely proportional  to CRP size.
Discussion
For current CRP payment levels to  fully compensate  a farmer for reduced
income,  the farm must return considerably less per acre than those in our
illustrations.  It  is not enough to have some  "marginal" land to put  into
9the CRP:  analysis of CRP  entry must consider  the financial  effects  on the
farm operation as a whole.
It might be argued that retiring "marginal".  CRP land will necessarily
increase expected average yields on the remaining ("better")  land.  This
would be  true if CRP land and set-aside  land are both of lower quality
than remaining planted land.  It could be true  for agronomic reasons,  as
well,  if inputs  freed by retired acres go  instead to  increase yields on
remaining land.  Expected yields,  if allowed to  increase  in the model,
will increase per-acre market revenues,  as  long as  costs  remain the same
or increase  at a slower rate.  The extent  to which this  also dampens  the
cost of CRP entry depends upon the extent to which lower plantings  after
the base bite are countered by higher per-acre yields.
What about a different mix of crops?  The corn-wheat-soybean farms of
our examples are more representative of southwestern than of southeastern
Minnesota.  Table 7 looks at a 200 acre CRP entry on corn-oats-alfalfa
farms with the same base configurations  as farms B, D, and F, above.
Results from Table 3 are repeated for comparison.  (Revenues for oats do
not include hay.)  The cost of  the CRP is  over $140/ac. on all  three
farms.
So  far, we have held fixed a great many prices and costs  that could
reasonably be expected to vary over  time and across  farms.  We here
examine variations  in market or on-farm conditions.  Table 8 shows how the
total CRP  cost would vary if our price and yield assumptions for  farm D
(corn-wheat-soybeans) were systematically altered.  The  cell "100%-100%"
shows  the current calculated CRP  cost  ($151.80).  If prices for  all crops
were 10%  higher and expected yields  10% higher  than we assumed, for
10Table  5:  Costs of CRP  entry below and above  the point where wheat base















Table  6:  Effect  of  CRP  size  on  CRP  costs.  Farm  D.  (Reduction
returns  per  CRP  acre  entered.)





































-. I.-  ----  I  I~~~~~~example, the CRP cost would be $187.40.  The  calculated CRP cost is
obviously sensitive to price and yield assumptions, as  would be expected.
One could also use Table 8 to characterize farms  that might  find
current CRP payment rates enticing.  For example,  farm D would break even
at  a CRP payment rate of $85/acre if expected yields were  less than 90%
and expected prices  less than 85%  of  those assumed in this report.
This analysis has been conducted under the assumption that farmers
would enter none, some, or all  of the eligible  land into the CRP,
depending upon expected changes  in net cash revenues.  There might be
cases, however, where  the decision to enter  is  independent of CRP payment
levels.  For example, a farmer might enter an eligible field that  is hard
to crop  and at the  same time rent nearby land in order to maintain the
same  size operation but reduce average production costs per acre.  The
same number of acres would be rented as are reduced by CRP entry.  (This
is a critical assumption.  In our example, net returns from soybeans  are
well beyond rental rates  in most areas of southern Minnesota.  The only
farmer for which the present discussion might hold is  one who wants to
maintain the same size operation--no bigger, no smaller.  Otherwise, the
farmer would presumably already be renting additional land to  grow beans
at a profit.)
How much would the new land have to rent  for in order  for the CRP entry
to have zero  (or positive) net cash return effects?  Consider a 25  acre  CRP
entry on farm D, where the total CRP  cost was shown to be $118.02/acre
entered.  Wheat base was reduced by 15.6 acres and bean plantings by 9.4
12Table  7:  Effect of crop mix on calculated CRP cost.  (Reduction in net



































$80/ac.Table  8:  Effects  of varying price and cost assumptions. Farm D. 200
acre CRP.  (Reduction in net returns per CRP acre entered.)
PRICE
(Proportion of current assumptions)
70%  80%  90%  100%  110%  120%  130%
YIELD  75%
(Proportion  80%










71.11  83.85  96.59  109.33  122.07  134.82  147.56
77.06  90.65  104.24  117.83  131.42  145.01  158.60
83.00  97.44  111.88  126.32  140.76  155.20  169.64
88.95  104.24  119.53  134.82  150.10  165.39  180.68
94.89  111.03  127.17  143.31  159.45  175.59  191.72
100.84  117.83  134.82  151.80  168.79  185.78  202.77
106.79  124.62  142.46  160.30  178.13  195.97  213.81
112.73  131.42  150.10  168.79  187.48  206.16  224.85
118.68  138.21  157.75  177.28  196.82  216.36  235.89
124.62  145.01  165.39  185.78  206.16  226.55  246.93
130.57  151.80  173.04  194.27  215.51  236.74  257.98
_  _I_  _1￿1  I  · _acres.  If CRP payments in the area are  $85/acre, each CRP  acre effectively
costs  the farmer $33.02.  With the costs  given above, a base acre of wheat
returns  $79.23 and an acre of beans returns  $162.  To keep the same  scale
of operation with the same relative crop mix, therefore,  the farmer would
have  to find 15.6 acres with wheat base renting at $46.21/acre or less and
9.4 acres  for beans  renting at $128.98/acre or less.
Summary
Landowner decisions  regarding CRP  entry will be made in part upon
consideration  of the reduction in whole-farm income resulting from
associated reductions in program and non-program crop plantings.  This
report has focused on the importance to  that decision of  the relative size
and make-up of the  farm's commodity acreage bases.
Balanced against these calculated CRP  costs must be  the annual per-acre
payment that the  government will make for CRP entry.  .For farms  in southern
Minnesota similar to those examined here, this payment will clearly not
cover current-year  foregone income.
Nevertheless, the Conservation Reserve Program has a number of non-cash
attributes that may encourage  entry by farmers in particular career or
ownership positions.  For example, CRP payments are essentially guaranteed
over ten years, whereas the deficiency payments that form a large part of
the CRP cost calculated here are potentially more ephemeral, dependent upon
Congressional renewal  every few years.  Furthermore, freed-up  labor and
capital resources, not considered in the present analysis, might be put to
more profitable use elsewhere.  This,  too, would reduce  the effective cost
of CRP entry and could make current annual payments  sufficiently
attractive.
15APPENDIX
The  model  used  to  calculate  CRP  entry  costs  in  this  report  is  based  upon





+  (p  -cr)R  - Zji(B.-aiRB/C  )ci'
where
NR - net cash returns  for  the farm operation
i  1,...,I --  program crops  index
k - 1,...,K --  non-program crops index
B.  - crop  acreage  base
B  -- farm  aggregate  acreage  base  (ZBi-B)
a.-  proportion  of base  bite  allocated  to  program  crop  i  (Za.=1.0)
1  3
k - proportion  of  available  land  allocated  to  non-program  crop  k
(zSk-1.0)
R  CRP acres
C  total cropland
d
p  - per-bushel deficiency payments
m p  - market prices
c. =  per-unit production costs
a ASCS established costs
Y  - expected  yields
- CRP payment per acre
c  - annualized CRP cost per acre
r
j.  - set-aside requirement (percent of base)
c  -per-acre  set-aside maintenance costs
16The base bite  is  therefore  (R/C)B, and permitted plantings is
[(l-ji)(Bi-aiRB/C)].  In the report's  tables,  r =  0.  To  focus attention
on land allocation,  let per-acre net returns  for each crop be
idya  m
\i  Psi  + (Pi-Ci)Y
and
mk  (-ck)Ye nk  k  (P k ' Yk'
The model becomes
J
NR - S[(l-ji ) (Bi-aiRB/C)]wi +  S[sk(C-B-R(1-B/C))]rk
+  (p -c)R  - Zji(Bi-6kRB/C)c..
We report reduction  (from R=O  levels)  in total farm net cash returns  per
CRP  acre, allocated to each crop proportional  to  its  acreage reduction.
(CRP maintenance costs are  allocated only to program crops, in  the same
proportion as  is  the base bite.)  For example,  the portion of the  total CRP
entry cost allocated to program crop  i is
I  I
Z  (1-ji)Bi)i - Z[(l-ji)(B i - a i RB/C)i.  - a.Rc  ]
R
I
- Z[i(l-j)  (B/C)i+aic  ], 1  1.  1  1  r






17We do not include the CRP payment in these calculations, because we want to
be able  to keep separate the current-year costs  and revenues  associated
with CRP  entry.
The model  is not placed in an optimizing framework, although it could
lend itself  to such treatment.  In particular, one might consider R, a, and
8 as  choice variables,  given fixed price, yield, and cost data.  We chose
instead  to  restrict the determination of a to a decision rule  and to
examine  the effects  of different levels of CRP entry on a range  of farm
types.
18